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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, improving quality of rail services by 
increasing availability, saving energy, and cutting the costs 
of infrastructure and rolling stock maintenance has become 
a central concern in the railway industry. Furthermore, 
considerable research efforts have been devoted to develop 
monitoring and health management solutions for the rail 
transportation systems. Streaming data from trains, 
infrastructure and signaling systems became a key subject 
for an implementation of a predictive maintenance. 
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is an approach 
that aims to support a predictive maintenance program. 
Basically, the first step to develop a PHM system is to 
identify critical components. This paper emphasizes on the 
critical components selection step. It presents a 
methodology to identify the critical components for the 
design of a PHM solution. The proposed methodology is 
based on objectives definition for PHM and it is applied to 
an Overhead Contact System (OCS). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The railway industry is aiming to develop more efficient and 
intelligent systems which can respond to the increasing need 
for mobility and time issues. In the last decade this industry 
showed a growing interest focused on maintenance 
techniques and monitoring systems for the rolling stocks, 
the signaling systems and the infrastructure (Lu, Shan, 
Tang, & Wen, 2016). In this context the current collection 
system is a key issue in modern railway industry. In fact, a 
degraded or even damaged components of the Overhead 
Contact System (OCS) or the current collectors can lead to 
train delays, infrastructure and rolling stock damages or 
even electrocution of passengers. In 2009 for example, 
catenary incidents generated more than 2500 hours of delay 
for 150 millions of euros of losses for the SNCF (Massat, 
2007).  
Within this framework, implementation of an adapted 
maintenance policy to manage the operability of the asset 
has become a crucial task for competitiveness. Regarding 
the security, reliability and availability requirements of 
systems such as OCS and pantograph, efforts are made to 
deploy a Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) and 
preventive maintenance policy for the railway infrastructure 
using inspection trains and diagnostics solutions. 
The PHM can be defined as a system engineering discipline 
which provides key processes, technologies, and techniques 
to achieve an accurate monitoring, asses the current state of 
an equipment, realize diagnostics, and estimate the future 
health state of a degrading asset. It is a discipline which 
enables the CBM and the predictive maintenance. 
In general, identification of critical components is the first 
step to deploy a PHM solution (Uckun, Goebel, & Lucas, 
2008). It aims to determine which component or sub-system 
contribute the most to the degradation and affect the 
performance of the system in term of availability, reliability 
and downtime costs. Moreover, the study of failure modes 
and mechanisms of critical components allows 
understanding the root causes of the damages and how it 
lead to failure of the component. This step provide 
necessary information to select appropriate and mature 
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diagnostic and prognostic technologies and the appropriate 
monitoring technology solution. 
In addition, most of the current PHM solutions are adapted 
to industrial systems or electronic components which are not 
compatible with the large-scale distributed systems such as 
railway infrastructure. In fact, railway infrastructure is 
composed of linear assets which span long distances and are 
composed of a large population of components. This implies 
that selection of critical components must comply with the 
system definition and relevant requirements defined for the 
prognostics and the diagnostics functions.  
In this paper we propose a systematic approach for the 
criticality determination of systems regarding a PHM 
system development. The section 2 present the different 
methodologies to determine critical component in reliability. 
The section 3 aims to propose an approach to assess the 
criticality of a system regarding a PHM implementation 
objectives. Then the methodology is applied to the OCS 
which have a great influence on the operability of the 
railway system. 
2. CRITICALITY DETERMINATION FOR PHM SYSTEMS 
DESIGN 
Classical diagnostics approaches use system control 
parameter and performance data to deduce and detect a 
faulty state of a sub-system or a component. However, with 
the development of systems complexity, detect faulty 
components or failures become increasingly complicated 
and necessitated the extraction of specific features using 
monitoring systems. In this context, we can distinguish two 
type of monitoring levels for the PHM implementation: 
system level monitoring which aims to get system 
performance and control data, and the component level 
monitoring which aims to supervise the behavior of critical 
components (Mosallam, Medjaher, & Zerhouni, 2015). In 
this way, the identification of critical components is a key 
task for a PHM system deployment. 
Traditionally, one way to define the critical components of a 
system is by conducting an analysis of system 
dependability. The dependability of a system is assessed 
using an evaluation of its attributes such as availability, 
reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability (Avizienis, 
Laprie, Randell, & Landwehr, 2004). There are several 
techniques to assess the reliability of a system depending on 
the available data and the context. The IEC standard (IEC-
60300-3-1, 2003) provides a list of techniques to support the 
engineers to assess the dependability of a system. 
These techniques can be classified into two main groups, 
namely the qualitative and the quantitative approaches. 
The qualitative and semi-qualitative approaches relies to 
experts’ judgment of the available data to identify and 
evaluate the potential failures to make a reasonable 
judgment of risks. These techniques can be decision or 
experience based and provide qualitative evaluation of the 
risk such as low, medium and high. Qualitative approach is 
usually performed using techniques such as Checklist, 
Failure Mode and Effects [Criticality] Analysis 
(FMEA/FMECA), Preliminary Hazard Analysis PHA, 
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). 
The quantitative approaches can be probabilistic or 
deterministic. These approaches use statistical methods to 
estimate measures such as failure rate, mean time to failure 
(MTTF), Mean time between failures (MTBF), etc. to 
evaluate a reliability of a system (IEC-60300-3-1, 2003). 
The most common used techniques are Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). Moreover the 
different approaches can be combined for system reliability 
and risk analysis (Tixier, J., Dusserre, G., Salvi, O., & 
Gaston, D., 2002). 
In the context of PHM, the FMEA and its extensions 
FMECA and FMMEA (Mathew, Das, Rossenberger, & 
Pecht, 2008) techniques are often used to assess the 
criticality of the system and define what prognostics can be 
done for the system regarding the components. 
3. PROPOSED APPROACH 
Deployment of PHM system for a CBM program can insure 
mainly objectives such as: increasing service reliability; 
increasing system availability; and decreasing maintenance 
costs. In the proposed methodology, identification of critical 
components is achieved regarding 3 objectives cited above 
for a CBM program implementation. In this framework, the 
goal is to assess the criticality of the system regarding each 
objective of the maintenance program, as depicted in the 
following chart: 
 
Figure 1. Select component regarding to PHM objectives. 
Thereafter, for each objective the identified critical 
components are ranked in regarding their criticality for the 
entire system. Then, failure modes and failure mechanism of 
the top critical components are studied to select precursors 
or parameters that influence the failure generation. This 
information is then used to identify the mature technology 
for sensors, monitoring, and data acquisition. 
 3.1. Components with High Impact on Service 
Reliability 
Components with a high failure rate can seriously affect 
service reliability. Insuring monitoring and predictive 
solutions can help to decrease the occurrence of these 
failures. In the context of railway infrastructure this can be 
achieved by the analysis of the most impacting components 
for incidents and failures; using FMEA analysis; FTA; or 
other system reliability assessment approaches. 
3.2. Identify Components with the Most Impact on 
Maintenance and Downtime Costs 
A PHM system can considerably reduce the life cycle cost 
(LCC) of a monitored system. Indeed, a monitoring system 
can reduce regular inspection costs by replacing some 
unnecessary tasks by necessary ones and plan maintenance 
tasks regarding the current and the future state of the 
system which can help to reduce spare parts costs and 
logistics. In addition, setting up a continuous monitoring 
and a diagnostic solution can help to identify accurately 
and quickly the failed components which allows reducing 
costs due to downtime.   
Consequently, the components which affect the most 
maintenance costs and downtime costs are identified in this 
step aiming a more efficient deployment of a PHM solution. 
3.3. Components with High Impact on System 
Availability 
To increase availability, the goal is to identify the 
component which have the most affecting failures. In other 
word, this step is dedicated to select the components which 
cause the most downtime per occurrence and the 
components with a high frequency of failure. An example of 
an identification methodology for critical component 
regarding their impact on system availability is proposed in 
(Wang & Nee, 2009). It is based on a four quadrant chart 
which illustrate the frequency rates of components failure 
vs. the average downtime associated. 
3.4. Decision Table 
After reviewing most impacting components for 
maintenance costs, service reliability, and system 
availability. A score is attributed to each component 
according to its criticality regarding the defined objective. 
Three indexes are defined, criticality index for service 
reliability (ISR), criticality index for maintenance costs 
(IMC), and criticality index for availability impact (IA). 
Four scores are defined for each index; 0 for the component 
which have no impact for the defined objective; 1 for a low 
criticality regarding the defined objective; 2 for medium 
criticality and 3 for a high criticality. The defined indexes 
are weighted. Thereafter, a criticality index (CI) is 
calculated for each component in order to rank them. An 
illustration of the decision table is presented below: 
 
Then, a Criticality Index (CI) is calculated for each 
component (k), as follows: 
 𝐶𝐼# = 𝛼	𝐼𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽	𝐼𝑀𝐶 + 𝛾	𝐼𝐴 (1) 
The parameters α, β, and γ in Eq. 1 represent the weights of 
each index. These weights can be defined regarding 
maintenance program objectives. 
For example, for a maintenance program with equal 
objectives for service reliability, maintenance costs, and 
availability; and a component which have no impact for 
Service reliability, a medium criticality for the maintenance 
costs and a high criticality for the system availability will 
have a critical index value of: 𝐶𝐼 = (1×0) +	(1×2) +(1×3) = 5 
3.5. Targets and Monitoring Parameters Definition 
After identification of critical components, the failure 
modes and failure mechanisms of each component are 
reviewed. Then targets are defined for each failure mode or 
failure mechanism. The targets can be the selection of 
sensors, acquisition system, or selection of a mature 
processes for diagnostics and prognostics. The figure 
presented above, summarize the procedure for the selection 
and the identification of the PHM system solutions through 
targets. Some of failure mechanisms can’t be monitored by 
sensors. They will not be reviewed for the PHM 
development however maintenance targets are set up for this 
kind of failures. 
  
Figure 2. Monitoring parameters selection procedure 
Table 1. Caption Decision table for critical components 
ranking. 
 
Components 
Service 
Reliability 
(ISR) 
Maintenance 
costs (IMC) 
Availability 
(IA) 
CI 
Component 1 2 3 2  
Component 2 3 1 1  
Component 3 2 2 3  
… …  …  
Component n 1 3 1  
 
  
4. CRITICAL COMPONENTS FOR THE OCS 
The data used for this study are gathered from different 
sources: OCS incident records for the French railway 
network (SNCF Open Data, 2016), data from experience 
feedback, and workshops with experts. In this paper, the 
studied OCS is built for a 2 x 25 kV electrified main line. 
4.1. The OCS 
Basically, the OCS system is an assembly of cables carrying 
necessary electrical energy to the trains. It is composed of 
simple conception components such as cables and pulleys. 
However, the dimensioning of each component requires 
relatively complex calculations to obtain a very accurate 
geometry. Furthermore, the procedures for mounting and 
adjustment of a catenary are result of decades of experience. 
There are multiple types of catenaries conceptions 
depending on the type of the carried current, train desired 
speed and environmental constraints. The Figure 3 shows a 
span section of an AC OCS system used for high speeds 
line. 
 
Figure 3. A span of an AC Overhead Contact System (UIC, 
2006) 
For the study, the components are classified into groups 
with the same function. The various sub-systems set out in 
the data tables are defined as follow: 
- Supports: mechanical parts including suspension 
fittings, head span support, incoming feed 
- Insulator: made of glass or composite materials  
- Steady arm 
- Messenger wire (Carrier): 65.4 mm2 bronze 
- Contact wire: 150 mm2 copper 
- Feeder: power supply or line (288 mm2 aluminum) 
- OCS suspension (droppers): 12 mm2 bronze dropper 
- Connections: power supply (feeder connections), 
continuity (tensioning equipment) 
- Tensioning equipment 
- Section insulator 
The insulators are used to separate the supply system 
(contact wire, carrier and droppers) from the earth. The 
steady arm insure the smooth crossing of the pantograph at 
supports and it is articulated at its bottom. The feeder is 
connected at specific points to carry the necessary current to 
the supply system. The insulators and the steady arm are 
presented in the following figure: 
 
Figure 4. Cantilever for an OCS (UIC, 2006) 
The tensioning device ensures that the carry system is kept 
at a mechanical tension to avoid its thermal expansion due 
to temperature variation. In addition, the conductors are 
anchored to the supports at midpoint of the section. The 
figure bellow shows the tensioning system: 
 
Figure 5. Tensioning device for the OCS (UIC, 2006) 
4.2. OCS Components with High Impact on Service 
Reliability 
The catenary is a high availability system which has a 
lifetime up to 40 years. However, incipient failures and 
defects can cause an inline traffic stop for a complete 
railway line, which can cause significant financial losses for 
operators. For the assessment of service reliability, analysis 
of incidents related to the studied system can be a good 
indicator to determine which component is critical for the 
service reliability.  
The table presented below shows the repartition of the OCS 
incidents. The data were obtained from recorded incidents 
 for the French railway network between November 2014 
and November 2015: 
 
In this table the OCS incidents are classified regarding their 
causes, we distinguish four types of causes: 
- Weather causes: lightning can cause insulators 
destroying, frosts or freezing rain can hinder the current 
collection on the contact wire, strong wind… 
- Rolling stock equipment and traction: these are the 
failures of signaling, a lack of maintenance on a 
pantograph, or non-compliance with procedural rules. 
- Infrastructure causes: this categories regroup the 
electrical or mechanical failures of catenary materials 
- Other causes: malicious acts, copper theft, falling 
objects, etc. 
The rates highlights the causes of infrastructure failures 
which represent 43% of the incident impacting the service 
reliability. Subsequently, the infrastructure incidents are 
studied to determine which component have more impact in 
terms of infrastructure failures.  
The analysis showed that 50% of infrastructure incidents 
were due to contact wire failures, 20% due to insulators 
failure, and 30% are due to other components failures or bad 
geometry of the catenary. Therefore, we can identify the 
contact wire and the insulators as the most impacting 
component for service reliability. The contact wire can be 
defined as a high criticality component (ISR = 3) and the 
insulators as a medium critical component (ISR = 2). 
4.3. OCS Components with High Impact on 
Maintenance and Downtime Costs 
In this section the critical components are selected 
regarding: overhaul, maintenance and downtime costs. 
The maintenance of the OCS is organized regarding planned 
tasks consisting mainly of visual inspections and 
measurements, such as feeder temperature, contact wire 
height and stagger or inspection of tensioning device, etc. 
Automated measurement tools and new sensors can 
considerably reduce cost for this kind of inspections.  
In order to determine the component which affect the most 
maintenance costs, data were collected from different 
operators and projects of Alstom Company in different 
regions. In addition, regular meetings, interview questions, 
and workshops with maintenance managers and experts 
were conducted. From this work, it was noted that the 
Contact Wire is the most critical and impacting component 
for the maintenance costs. Indeed, maintenance budget for 
the OCS was about 186 millions of euros in 2007 for the 
French railway network. The renewal of the contact wire 
represent 48 millions of euros per year for replacement of 
500km of contact wire. This represent about 25% of the 
OCS maintenance budget each year. Moreover, the local 
wear is 80% of factor of renewal of the contact wire. 
Another aspect of conducted study was to identify the 
component the OCS which is the most impacting for 
downtime costs.   
The table below shows the contribution of different OCS 
components on train delays. The data in this table are based 
on a survey realized on a high-speed line equipped with a 
2x25 kV OCS. 
 
Train delays can be very costly for railway operators. The 
study of the distribution of train delays due to OCS 
components allows us to rank the most critical components 
regarding downtime costs, the contribution of components 
for train delays, and the previous considerations regarding 
maintenance costs, we can then define the IMC index for 
each component as described in the Table 3. 
4.4. OCS Components which Impact System Availability 
In this step we select the component with the highest impact 
on downtime and failure rate. The aim is to identify the 
most critical failures affecting service and system 
availability. The approach proposed in this section is based 
on the four quadrant approach proposed in (Wang and Nee, 
2009) for the identification of critical components. 
Table 2. OCS Incidents Distribution. 
 
Cause type Other Weather conditions 
Traction 
equipment 
Infrastructure 
Involvement 
rate 18% 3% 36% 42% 
 
Table 3. Contribution of components/sub-systems to 
OCS train delays. 
 
Component/ 
Equipment 
% contribution per delay category 
IMC Short 
Delay Long Delay 
Cancelation 
or Delay 
>60min 
Support 0 0 0 0 
Insulator 19.29 15.82 12.12 2 
Steady arm 2.89 0.51 0 1 
Contact wire 45.99 35.71 53.03 3 
Feeder 5.4 3.57 7.58 1 
Messenger 
wire 0 0 1.51 1 
Suspension 
equipment 0 0 0 0 
Power supply 
connections 2.25 10.2 1.51 1 
Tensioning 
equipment 0 0 0 0 
Section 
insulator 0 0.51 0 1 
 
The Figure 5 shows the component fault frequency for the 
OCS according to the average downtime of the system 
caused by components. Therefore, four quadrant numbered 
1-4 are defined based on expert’s knowledge and 
requirements. The quadrant 1 contains the components with 
a low average downtime and component failure rate, which 
it means that the actual maintenance policy work well for 
these components and the components have a low impact on 
service availability. Quadrant 2 contains the components 
with a high failure frequency and a low average downtime. 
An efficient diagnostic process can help maintainers to 
detect the failures of these components earlier and take 
actions more efficiently. The quadrant 3 comprise 
components with a high average downtime and a high 
failure frequency. This kind of components failures should 
be fixed at the design stage. The quadrant 4 include the most 
critical components as they have a low failure frequency 
with a high average downtime. A diagnostic and prognostic 
process can be applied to this kind of component to prevent 
their failure and estimate their RUL. 
In the case of the OCS, the Figure 5 highlight the criticality 
of the contact wire which is a part of the quadrant 4, 
therefore we define an IA=3 index for this component. In 
addition, the quadrant 2 contains the insulator which allows 
us to define an IA=2 index. 
 
Figure 6. Component fault frequency Vs. Downtime for an 
2 x 25 kV OCS 
4.5. Decision Table for OCS system 
In this step, the criticality index CI of each component is 
calculated. The weights for each objective is equal regarding 
the operator targets for maintenance and service. The 
components are then ranked depending on their criticality. 
The table 3 shows the obtained criticality for each 
component regarding the defined objectives: 
 
The contact wire has a high criticality in for the service 
reliability, maintenance costs and system availability. This 
analysis was confirmed by Alstom engineers and experts. A 
PHM program should give solution to monitor the contact 
wire and the other identified components such as insulators, 
section insulators, and steady arm, carrier, feeder and power 
supply connection. The study of the failure modes and the 
failure mechanisms will allow us to select the mature PHM 
solution for the OCS. 
4.6. Define Targets and Parameters to Monitor for the 
OCS 
In this step, the failure modes and failure mechanisms of 
each critical component are studied. The aim is to identify 
and select the right parameters to monitor and select 
monitoring parameters. The Figure 7 gives an example of 
the target definition for the contact wire:  
 
Figure 7. Target and parameters identification for OCS 
From experts knowledge we can determine three failure 
modes for the contact wire (CW):  
- Mechanical breakage of the CW,  
Table 4. Decision table for OCS critical component 
ranking. 
 
Components 
Service 
Reliability 
(ISR) 
Maintenance 
costs (IMC) 
Availability 
(IA) 
CI 
Contact wire 3 3 3 9 
Insulator 2 2 0 4 
Section 
insulator 0 1 2 3 
Steady arm 0 1 0 1 
Feeder 0 1 0 1 
Messenger 
wire 0 1 0 1 
Power supply 
connections 0 1 0 1 
Support 0 0 0 0 
Suspension 
equipment 0 0 0 0 
Tensioning 
equipment 0 0 0 0 
 
 - Sag on the contact wire due to excessive CW dilatation,  
- Bad fitting of a CW.  
The sag of the CW due to its dilatation can be caused by 
extreme weather conditions or tensioning device failure. In 
order to monitor this failure, a target is set up to monitor 
weather and tensioning device.  
Bad fitting of the CW can be caused by an installation issue, 
improper plans or mounting diagrams. It can also be caused 
by failure of supports or steady arms. In the context of PHM 
a continuous monitoring system for the height and the 
stagger of the catenary can be a solution to detect this 
failure. Moreover monitoring cameras for cantilevers and 
supports can be installed in trains in order to track supports 
defects.  
Wear of the CW can be local or global and can lead to the 
breakage of the contact wire. From the literature (Bucca & 
Collina, 2015) the wear of the CW is due to a contribution 
of three physical phenomena: mechanical wear due to 
friction, electrical wear due to current flow at the contact 
area between the CW and the pantograph stripes, and 
abrasion due to electrical arcs. For wear mechanism we can 
define parameters to monitor as shown in the Figure 7. 
Based the on these monitoring parameters a mature 
prognostics and diagnostics solution can be selected for the 
CW. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The main contribution of this article is the proposal of a 
methodology for components criticality determination 
regarding a PHM program deployment. The methodology is 
based on the analysis of the criticality of each component or 
sub-system through three main objectives: increase service 
reliability, decrease cost impact of critical component, and 
increase system availability. The methodology was applied 
to the OCS system which is a large-scale distributed system 
and the procedure to select the monitoring parameters and 
identify diagnostics and prognostics technology was 
presented. The procedure can be applied to other type of 
systems and his advantage is to give more impact benefits 
for a PHM system deployment as the critical components 
are identified through different objectives. Moreover, the 
methodology can be extended by integrating a more 
efficient cost analysis based on the life cycle cost of the 
system and more efficient methodologies for availability 
analysis. 
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